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ABSTRACT Catalonian secessionism acquired prominence from 2010 onwards. During the
last decade secessionist parties won three regional elections and sustained Governments by
tiny majorities at the Autonomous Parliament. Two illegal consultations about self-
determination were called and around 2 million (38% of population census) supported
secession from Spain. An “Independence Declaration” was proclaimed on 27th Oct. 2017,
followed by suspension of Home Rule sanctioned by Spanish Parliament that endured till mid-
2018. The main consequence of the secessionist push was the build-up of a confrontation
between two large segments of Catalan citizenry, unionists and secessionists, which was
absent before. This study aims to shed light on the rise of secessionism and the appearance
of a deep fissure between these communities. By building upon the complete series of data
from iterated official polls (88.538 respondents, 45 surveys), the paper displays the evolving
changes along the period 2006–2019 of national identity feelings (“sense of belonging”). Along
that period, there were increases exceeding 15 percentage points of “only Catalan” national
identity and analogous decreases of "equally Catalan and Spanish" dual national identity. The
findings disclosed highly significant covariations between changing trends on national identity
feelings with: (1) family/mother language, Catalan vs. Spanish; (2) following regional media
versus other media. Since language/ascendancy origins and media consumption trends are
closely interrelated, within Catalonia, our discussion focuses on the role played by such
ethno-cultural cleavage. Further, statistical analysis for longitudinal data identified several
turning points linked to singular political events that likely accentuated polarization around
the issue of secession. The findings unveil evolving tracks that could help in the under-
standing of a process that, in a very short time, produced a severe social division within a fully
open and democratic society at the heart of Europe.
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The surge, rapid evolution and failed culmination of therecent secessionist attempt at Catalonia was a uniqueexperiment in contemporary Western politics. It carried
characteristic ingredients: (1) gigantic and iterated street
demonstrations fueled by an unrelenting and skillful activism; (2)
absence of a clear secessionist majority within the region; (3)
strong impulse and direction given by a Regional Government
and an Autonomous Parliament openly confronting Central
Powers; (4) systematic pro-secession bias by public media con-
trolled by Autonomous powers; (5) overwhelming social pressure
by a continuous presence of secessionist symbols everywhere; (6)
successful silencing of the majoritarian non-secessionist citizenry
throughout most of the upsurge (Barrio and Field, 2018; Elliott,
2018). All that arising at one of the richest and more advanced
Spanish regions, within a democratic context at the heart of the
European Union. The upsurge was an unexpected, enduring and
extremely resilient mass movement (Crameri, 2014, 2015) that
attracted global media attention (Minder, 2017; Morel, 2018),
leaving the Spanish Government paralyzed for years and the
European Union perplexed (see at SI, a summary of events and
electoral results).
A plethora of interpretations (Amat, 2015, 2017; Barrio and
Field, 2018; Barceló-Soler, 2013; Boylan, 2015; Crameri,
2014, 2015; Coll et al., 2018; Cuadras-Morató and Rodon, 2018;
Dowling, 2018; Elliot, 2018; Griffiths et al., 2015; Minder, 2017;
Morel, 2018; Serrano, 2013), tried to explain the secessionist surge
at Catalonia focusing mainly on economic and socio-political
issues: a deep economic recession during the preceding years;
irritation with malfunctioning and corruption of Spanish parties
and institutions; arrogance and passivity of Spain’s central gov-
ernment in front of a movement instigated by ambitious and
discontent regional elites; weaknesses and inadequacies of the
European Union. These factors surely contributed in varying
degrees, though they left unexplained why they had uniquely
combined within a single European region, to the point of trig-
gering urgent demands for segregation, while similar tensions did
not appear in other comparable Southern Europe regions.
Barrio and Field (2018) proposed that the secessionist push was
not simply a bottom-up process where malcontent and self-
organized citizens increasingly escalated demands for indepen-
dence. Longitudinal findings had shown that Catalan political
elites were more radical than citizens and that outbidding to win
hegemony in the pro-secession camp probably fueled the move-
ment (Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel, 2017). Hence the secessionist
surge could have depended also from top-down influences arising
from harsh competition between nationalist elites and parties to
keep a dominant position within the Region. From such per-
spective the secessionist wave (“the procés”), was a movement
nourished by local elites narrowly intermingled with the Auton-
omous administration, to take advantage of the “window of
opportunity” (Griffiths et al., 2015) opened by the deep economic
and political weaknesses of a Spain near bankruptcy, during
2008–2013 period.
The more important consequence of the failed secession ven-
ture was the excavation of a deep divide of Catalan society into
two confronted communities: secessionists and unionists1. The
lack of a social majority behind the secessionist attempt opened
apprehensions and frictions that had been mostly absent pre-
viously (Amat, 2015; Barrio and Field, 2018; Elliot, 2018; Dowl-
ing, 2018). Close neighbors, colleagues, acquaintances and even
friends and families who had shared feelings of belonging to both
Catalonia and Spain (in different degrees), as a part of their
values, are now divided on the issue of secession and must endure
living together amid an unsolved tension (Amat, 2017; Barrio and
Field, 2018; Coll et al., 2018; Elliott, 2018). National identity
feelings (“sense of belonging”) are a main mediator of the divide
between secessionists and unionists (Oller et al., 2019a, 2019b):
the first ones declare an almost exclusive emotional/affective
identity link with Catalonia, whereas unionists have various
communal affects, with a dominant double attachment with
Spain-Catalonia (Catspanish). The accentuation of affective fea-
tures of identity around a specific political divide (accept/reject
secession), can reproduce similar paths towards increasing ani-
mosity and ruthless partisanship that have characterized recent
political struggle at several Western societies (Von Babel and
Pereira, 2018). Harsh partisanship between USA democrats and
republicans that grew through an increasingly narrow fusion
between self and group identities is a prominent example of that
(Mason, 2018), and the contemptuous struggle that currently
divide Britons on the issue of remaining or leaving the EU is
another one (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Zmigrod et al., 2018).
During deep political crises the existence of unsealed ethno-
cultural cleavages is a widely known pre-requisite to trigger
processes of quick polarization between neighboring communities
(Horowitz, 2001; Esteban et al., 2012). The ethnolinguistic clea-
vage that separates the two main Catalonian communities had
been highlighted by Miley (2007, 2013). The first ones use Cat-
alan language in all domains, whereas the second ones prefer
Spanish despite their knowledge of Catalan language2. Using
survey data from CEO Barometers3 after the four Regional elec-
tions between 2010 and 2017, Bertomeus (2018) found that
Catalan-speaking citizens augmented their support to secessionist
parties, whereas Spanish-speaking ones increased their vote for
unionist parties in divergent though comparable shifts. OEC
Group (2017) had also showed that such tendency towards a
stronger political polarization was rooted on the main linguistic
divide. Llaneras (2017) added socioeconomic factors to the gap
between unionists and secessionists. Secession appealed mostly to
native Catalans (CEO Barometer July 2017): it was higher among
citizens born in Catalonia and with at least one parent born there,
with a maximum (75%) for those with long native ascendancy.
Among citizens coming from abroad or from other Spanish
regions, and for those born within the region from migrant par-
ents, secession was not attractive at all. The divide depended also
on incomes: secession support predominated among citizens with
highest incomes and among those who said: “we live comfortably”.
On the contrary, most people with the lowest salaries and those
disclosing “many economic difficulties” were against secession.
Maza et al. (2019) multivariate analysis of voting behavior at the
last Regional Elections (21 Dec. 2017), confirmed the priority of
ascendancy origins to explain the results, while greatly diminish-
ing the relevance of economic factors. Cuadras-Morató and Rodon
(2018) obtained fully concordant results using survey and electoral
data, at two time points, and Oller et al. (2019b) as well, in a
parallel analysis of the longitudinal data used here.
This ethnocultural cleavage defined a breaking line for the
division created by the secessionist campaign (Tobeña, 2017;
Barrio and Field, 2018; Elliot, 2018). The divide has not arrived at
the threshold of an open violent conflict, though tensions were
high during autumn of 2017 and they subsist while the situation
remains on a chronic standstill. Frictions are not rare at different
social scenarios and keep confronted two communities who had
enjoyed a long tradition of tolerant and convivial relationships
(Amat, 2015, 2017; Barrio and Field, 2018; Elliot, 2018). There
have been worries that such a divide might lead to inter-group
clashes that would carry the ingredients that appear in societies
sheltering unsealed ethno-cultural frontiers (Esteban et al., 2012;
Horowitz, 2001; Lustick et al., 2004; Sidanius et al., 1997; Sorens,
2005; Miley, 2007; Castano, 2008; Qvortrup, 2014; Waytz et al.,
2014).
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The present paper aims to shed light on enacting vectors that
facilitated the division between the two main communities in
Catalonia. We do that by bringing extensive data of surveys
collected from 2006 to 2019 by the official Catalan survey agency
(CEO Barometer). The longitudinal analyses of variations of the
main variable, namely “sense of belonging” feelings (from “Only
Catalan” to “Only Spanish” distinctive national identities, as
defined through the five categories at the surveys), may add
important clues to the unsolved discussion about plausible
sources of the building of what is now a souterrain confrontation
(Barrio and Field, 2018; Elliott, 2018; Maza et al., 2019; Tormos
et al., 2014). We will focus first on variations of sense of belonging
feelings in two significant segments of Catalan citizens, those
whose family language is Catalan vs. those whose family language
is Spanish. This is mandatory since previous findings either from
survey data or from electoral results had established the priority
of this ethnolinguistic cleavage rooted on ascendancy origins
(Cuadras-Morató and Rodon, 2018; Maza et al., 2019; Miley,
2007, 2013; Oller et al., 2019a, 2019b). Secondly, we will assess the
evolving changes of sense of belonging depending on media fol-
lowing preferences—whether the official TV and Radio controlled
by the Regional Government (broadcasting exclusively in Catalan
language), vs. other TV and Radios, because in previous studies
we and others had shown the importance of this variable (Garcia,
2013; Tobeña, 2017; Oller and Satorra, 2017; Oller et al.,
2019a, 2019b). Since media and language are closely interrelated
within the region, our analysis will address an exciting issue,
namely the language acting as a protective umbrella from pro-
paganda from the other side.
Through detailed analyses of trend variations of “sense of
belonging” (national identity feelings), across the whole devel-
opment of the secessionist push, we wanted to explore the rele-
vance of some “turning points” linked to recognizable induction
events. In this way, we expected to disclose patterns of data which
may help to discern between bottom-up vs. top-down pathways
about the sources of the conflict. We finally foresee that our
detailed, systematic and mostly descriptive/correlational statistical
evidence can work as starting point to further searches looking
for more fully substantive explanations of this unexpected, serious
and stagnated political crises at the heart of Europe.
Methods
To study the changing evolution of secessionist vs. unionist
strength among Catalonian citizenry we worked exclusively with
data obtained by C.E.O. Barometers (the official survey agency of
the Regional Government), along the period 2006–2019. This
data was supplied in open access from March 2006 to the present
and includes the totality of biannual/triannual systematic surveys
that CEO launches with high regularity. The sample sizes of
45 surveys analyzed oscillated between 2500 and 1500 citizens
each, with the exception of autumn 2017 survey which had only
1338 citizens. We had thus a total of 88.538 respondents.
Our research focus (longitudinal opinion trends about the issue
of secession) is a multifaceted phenomenon that can be quantified
by many variables, among others by “Sense of Belonging”
(National Identity Feelings), “Preferences for political links with
Spain”, “Affirmative/Negative answers on a legal referendum
about secession” and others. We selected “National Identity
Feelings” as our main target because it was studied in the whole
series of CEO surveys and does not depend on changing political
labels that may distort the results. Findings on “Preferences for
political links between Catalonia and Spain” and explicit “Sup-
port/Reject of secession” in a hypothetic referendum of inde-
pendence are briefly presented as well at Supplementary
Information (SI). We explored the relationship between our main
variable with others related to the main ethnolinguistic cleavage
that characterizes Catalonian citizenry. Specifically, we con-
sidered, for each survey, the qualitative variables Family/Mother
language and the binary variable Follow news on public regional
media (TV or radio, under control of Regional Government) or
not, variable that we can refer hereafter as News (See at SI
Appendix the Detailed Survey Questions studied).
We were fully aware of the limits and restrictions we adopted
in our analyses of an obviously multi-causal phenomenon.
Among the ‘stories' offered by different options regarding seces-
sion, citizens can ‘opt' for one of them for many reasons: some
related to their entourage—family, friends, co-workers, even their
own random histories; others, from current economic hardships
or affective/ideological affinities; others from information
received through the media or social networks, and so on.
Therefore, to be able to discern the causes of the changing trends
in this issue, a detailed and systematic follow-up of specific
individuals would be necessary, an information that it is not
available.
Hence, due to the nature of our data we decided to limit
ourselves to study significant stochastic dependencies between
variables: just a strictly statistical work (descriptive plus correla-
tional), although it is true that, in this context, high stochastic
associations might suggest plausible explanations of the
mechanisms that shaped the observed trends. Subsequent
explorations of these associations would require accruing other
data and other mathematical tools. To our view, the so-called
'statistical causal models’ assess ‘causal' relationships only under a
theoretical frame or hypothesis that are external to statistics. We
do not pre-assume a theory, so our emphasis in this paper is to
exploit a rich database to unveiling significant associations that
should shed light on the plausibility of alternative theoretical
frames or hypothesis. Other analysis could be pursued incor-
porating other type of data, to study the likelihood of alternative
explanatory models.
Longitudinal changes of national identity feelings and lin-
guistic groups. We estimated first, the distinctive percentages of
“sense of belonging” (national identity feelings), an essential
underlying variable of the phenomenon studied, in the overall
population and in different family language groups, obtained
from survey samples, with some supplied weights if necessary. As
already stated the sample sizes of the 45 surveys analyzed oscil-
lated between 2500 and 1500 citizens each (autumn 2017 survey
had only 1338 citizens), and we had a total of 88.538 respondents.
The standard deviations of conditional distributions (sense of
belonging conditioned to family/mother language4) for samples
between 2500 and 1500 for the main population segments (25%
of the population or more), oscillated from 2.5% to 1%.
We then plotted the longitudinal changes of national identity
feelings between 2006 and 2019 in the overall population
distinguishing also by the main family/mother language groups:
the Catalan-group (34.9% was the size of this linguistic group at
the last survey, July 2019) and the Spanish-group (57.3% was its
size, at that survey). For the sake of clarity, we decide to plot only
the more frequent identity feelings in each linguistic group:
people who considered both languages, Spanish and Catalan, as
their family/mother languages (4.1% was the size of this linguistic
group at July 2019 survey) exhibited an intermediate behavior.
We added also a smooth 95% confidence band based on a
generalized additive model implemented through the R package
mgcv (Wood et al., 2016; Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990).
Furthermore, in the plots, we marked also historical events that
might have been relevant to understand the evolution of the
studied variables along the period. These events were: the date
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when a new Home Rule was approved (New Statute); the
resolution of the High Spanish Court (Tribunal Constitutional-
TC) that sanctioned 14 articles (over 223) as contrary to the
Spanish Constitution and restricted the preamble and another 27
articles (June, 2010); the peak protests of the social 15M
movement (15M Peak Protests, June 2011); the regional elections
of November 25, 2012 (25N); the illegal consultation about
independence of November 9, 2014 (9N); the regional elections of
September 27, 2015 (27S); the illegal referendum about secession,
October 1, 2017 (1 Oct) and the regional elections, December 21,
2017 (21D).
Additionally, in order to identify important change points
detected in the series, we used the R package ecp designed for
nonparametric multiple change point analysis of multivariate
data (James and Matteson, 2013, 2014), which implements a
divisive hierarchical algorithm to detect reasonable change points,
through a bisection method and a permutation test. We worked
at 0.025 significance level and demanding at least six observa-
tions, from 1.75 to 2 years, between change points. The change
points obtained using this approach are indicated as vertical red
lines in the figures. These change points were obtained using the
complete profile of national identity feelings of the groups: from
those who self-considered Only Spanish to those who self-
diagnosed as Only Catalans, including also the class of DK/NA
(do not know or no answer). Hence, they are multivariate results
although the series showed the evolution of main profiles of each
linguistic group.
Longitudinal changes of national identity feelings, linguistic
groups and regional public media. We studied also the evolution
of these national identity feelings considering not only family/
mother language but also a dichotomous variable constructed
taking into account whether the news were followed or not
through regional public media (TV channel TV3, and radio sta-
tion Catalunya Radio). First, we plotted the evolution of national
identity feeling ‘Only Catalan’ in the four groups of the Catalo-
nian population obtained crossing the two main categories of
Family/mother language (Catalan vs. Spanish) with the dichot-
omous variable News (with also two levels, according to whether
the news were followed at regional public media or not). The
obtained graphics allow to compare the different evolution of
these groups. Secondly, we have obtained the same graphics but
with the national identity feeling ‘equal Spanish than Catalan’ in
the same groups as before and comparing their evolution.
We additionally analyzed this data, as an approximation,
through the perspective of Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA).
For the sake of simplicity, we started with two ordinary univariate
analysis and continued with a combination of them in a bivariate
version of MANCOVA, that we shall describe hereafter. At the
start, we considered two factors for both analysis whose levels
were the different possible values of the qualitative variable
family/mother language (with two levels corresponding to the
main linguistic groups: Catalan and Spanish) and the dichot-
omous variable News (with also two levels, according to whether
the news were followed at regional public media or not), using
Time (from 2006) as a covariate and considering as dependent
variable the percentages of those who feel ‘only Catalan’, for the
first analysis, or ‘equal Spanish than Catalan’, for the second one.
Since the interaction between factors was highly significant, to
facilitate the analysis we built a new factor, Group, with four
levels, combining the two levels of Family/mother language factor
and both levels of the factor News. We have used this factor to
replace the previously mentioned original binary factors in the
final analysis.
Notice that there were two sources of randomness: one
corresponding to the sample procedure and another correspond-
ing to the political and communicative events along the period:
we used a linear model as a simple way to deal with both sources
of variability, just as an approximation, introducing Time (in
years, from 2006) to try to capture potential trends and checking
the global adequacy of this approach examining the standard
output supplied by the function lm of R package stats. We supply
also a graphic plot illustrating the dependence of each percentage
(‘only Catalan’ and ‘equal Spanish than Catalan’) with respect to
Time covariate, in each one of the four levels determined by both
factors. We did as well a bivariate version of these analysis,
considering both variables. Most of the results of this analysis can
be found at SI Appendix.
Finally, also at SI, we supply a summary of relevant percentages
of national identity feelings at specific relevant moments: the
initial and final values, on the period 2006–2018, and these
percentages immediately before and after the regional elections at
25th November 2012 (Table SI-6).
2D dynamic profile diagram. To compare the evolution of the
groups obtained considering family/mother language (Catalan
vs. Spanish) and whether news were followed or not through the
regional public media (Regional vs. Others), we could analyze
the plot series of all percentages of “Sense of belonging” for each
one of them. These groups would be: A (family/mother language
Catalan, following news in public regional media), B (family/
mother language Catalan, not following news in public regional
media), C (family/mother language Spanish, following news in
public regional media) and D (family/mother language Spanish,
not following news in public regional media); but this would
have required plotting 4 × 6= 24 series of distinctive percen-
tages of “Sense of belonging”, along the period. We present
instead a synthetic two-dimensional Dynamic Profile Diagram
(of Sense of Belonging, in this case) through the period 2006
−2019. Essentially, it is a two dimensional (2D) Multi-
dimensional Scaling (MDS) representation of the abstract space
of Sense of Belonging profiles, using the Hellinger distance
(Burbea and Rao, 1982). Each one of the four groups, at a
particular time, is represented first as a point on the above
mentioned (six dimensional) abstract space and then, though
the MDS techniques, as a point on a 2D-plot. Since each of these
four points are not fixed, they apparently ‘move’ as Sense of
belonging feelings change, then we may connect them in the plot
to facilitate viewing the change along time. Therefore, the evo-
lution of profiles at different time points is seen as a continuous
broken line, for each group, in the 2D representation. This
graphic provides a simple overall summary of the joint evolution
of the various groups. More technical details of this MDS graph
can be found at SI.
Other variables. We repeated the analysis on another qualitative
variable: Preferences for political link between Catalonia and
Spain, whose values indicated preferences for a centralized state
(Catalonia as a Region), actual status quo (Home Rule, CA), an
explicit federal solution (Federal) or an independent state
(Independent Catalonia), considering also DK/NA options. The
results come at SI. Furthermore, the positive/negative explicit
answers in the event of a hypothetic legal referendum about
secession from Spain were also analyzed (see SI). This was a
qualitative variable with three possible outcomes: Yes, No and
DK/NA, reproducing the approach and contrasts of the main
methods exposed.
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Ethical approval. All the data for this research came from the C.
E.O. Barometers, the official survey agency of the Regional
Government, complying with the full legal Spanish requirements
and restrictions to conduct sociological studies about voting
behavior and political opinion, and in accordance to the ESO-
MAR International Code on Market, Opinion and Social Research
and Data Analytics. All the statistical analyses included in this
paper fulfilled, in addition, the conditions established by the
Ethical Commissions of the University of Barcelona, Pompeu
Fabra University and the Autonomous University of Barcelona
for treatment of human data, when their original source are
surveys made by official agencies or private firms under specific
external regulations with due guarantees. An ethics approval was
not required for this secondary analysis of the data, as per the
authors’ institutions and national regulations.
Results
Longitudinal changes. We considered first the profiles of the
variable National Identity Feelings (Sense of Belonging) along the
whole period, 2006–2019 (see Fig. 1). This is a qualitative variable
with six distinct values: Only Spanish (Spn), More Spanish than
Catalan (Spn>Cat), Equal Spanish than Catalan (Spn=Cat),More
Catalan than Spanish (Cat>Spn), Only Catalan (Cat) and DK/NA
(do not know or no answers). Percentages were estimated from
45 surveys over the period 2006–2019 on samples of sizes
between 2500 and 1500 persons (one survey, at 2017, with 1338
only), with a total number of 88.538 respondents. In all, there was
a total increase of 13 percentage points of those who feel ‘only
Catalans’ and a fall of 7 percentage points of Catalan citizens who
feel ‘equal Catalan than Spanish’, signaling a substantial variation
towards decreasing the relevance of dual CatSpanish National
Identity feelings. Such variations (Fig. 1) attained magnitudes that
clearly exceeded 15 percentage points at some points, on both
directions, along the whole period.
The more remarkable facts in Fig. 1 are the changes that arise
in around 2012 on the size of two critical segments defined by this
National identity feeling variable. In that year, the dual national
identity group ‘Equal Spanish than Catalan’ initiates an abrupt
descend to nearly 17 percentage points (not yet recovered), while
single national identity feeling group ‘Only-Catalan’ initiates an
abrupt escalation of roughly 20 points (not yet reversed). Such a
change in groups that are critical for cohesion of the whole society
call for further inspection involving other variables.
To deepen the analysis, we studied National Identity Feelings in
different population segments, obtained through another quali-
tative variable: Family/Mother language (surveys used slightly
different questions to address that, along the period, see SI
Appendix). This is a qualitative variable whose main values are
either Catalan language or Spanish language that represented the
34.9% and 57.3% of the total population respectively, at the last
survey studied, July 2019 (see Fig. 2). The remaining cases were
people who answered both Spanish and Catalan languages as
family/mother languages. They represented 4.1% of the popula-
tion at the last survey. Other cases were negligible.
The small group whose family/mother language was ‘Both’
(Spanish and Catalan), exhibited an intermediate behavior, so its
graph has been omitted for the sake of brevity. For the Catalan-
group (family/mother language), the detected change points
(considering profiles of all sense of belonging feelings) appeared
between the second and the third CEO 2010 Barometer (as a
decimal number approx. 2010.4), and the second and third CEO
2012 Barometer (as a decimal number 2012.65). For the Spanish-
group (family/mother language), the detected change points
(considering also profiles of all sense of belonging) were between
the second and the third CEO 2011 Barometers (as a decimal
number 2011.65), and the second and the third CEO 2013
Barometers (as a decimal number 2013.7). The more striking
changes appeared within the Catalan-group (as defined by family/
mother language), in particular around the regional elections of
25th Nov. 2012.
The marks in these plots signal events that might have been
relevant to understand the evolution of the variables along the
period (see Methods). The crucial change points detected by the
Fig. 1 Longitudinal changes of National Identity Feelings across the period 2006–2019, for all Catalonian population. Each band shows the evolution of
proportions for each national identity feeling (percentages) across the whole period. DK/NA omitted. Bands based on 95% smooth confidence intervals.
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package ecp, as explained above, were marked as red lines within
the plots.
The effects of following news on public regional media. To
obtain a more detailed picture of the evolution of sense of
belonging in the main linguistic groups we analyzed the relevance
of another variable constructed taking into account the answers of
following the news either through regional public media (TV or
radio that broadcast exclusively in Catalan language) or through
other media. This variable, which will be referred as News, is
dichotomous reaching only two possible values: Regional or
Other. We directed our focus (see Fig. 3) to the sense of belonging
‘Only Catalan’ for the Catalan-group (as defined by family/
mother language) and for the Spanish-group (also defined by
family/mother language).
There were abrupt changes in the sense of belonging ‘Only
Catalan’ along the period, clearly dependent on their family/
Fig. 2 Longitudinal changes of National Identity Feelings, across the period 2006–2019, depending on language segmentation. Two Catalonian population
segments are considered. UP: a refers to citizens with Family/Mother language Catalan (at July 2019 survey: 34.9% of all Catalonian population). Down:
b refers to citizens with Family/Mother language Spanish (at July 2019 survey: 57.3% of all Catalonian population). Bands based on 95% smooth
confidence intervals.
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mother language but also dependent on having been exposed to
follow the news in regional public media or not (Fig. 3). The
relevance of these where examined through a standard Analysis of
Covariance. The dependent variable is the percentage of sense of
belonging ‘Only Catalan’ considering a factor Group (four levels)
and Time (year) as a covariate. The Group factor and the
interactions were highly significant (see SI). Furthermore,
comparing the slope of the regression lines, we find that all the
slopes are significantly different with the exception of the slopes
of two groups: family/mother language Spanish who follow news
in public regional media and family/mother language Catalan
who follow news in other media; all the other levels exhibit highly
significant different slopes (p-values obtained by Tukey method
less than 0.0001). See Table SI-2 for more details.
The same analysis of covariance is repeated considering as a
dependent variable the percentage of sense of belonging ‘Equal
Spanish than Catalan’ (see Fig. 4), with the same factor Group and
Time as covariate, as before. The effects of Group factor and the
interactions were highly significant (see SI). Moreover, comparing
the slope of the regression lines, we can get the different effects of
media at the four levels of Group factor. Notice that with the
exception of the slope between both family/mother language Catalan
subgroups, all other levels exhibited very significantly different slopes
(p-values obtained by Tukey method less/equal than 0.0061, most of
them less than 0.0001). See Table SI-4 for more details.
To complete the analysis, we considered both dependent
variables simultaneously (MANCOVA), obtaining that both
Group factor, the covariate Time and the interactions were highly
significant (see also SI).
2D dynamic profile diagram. The four subgroups obtained by
distinguishing family/mother language (Catalan vs. Spanish) and
whether news were followed in regional public media or other-
wise, are represented in different colors and letters (see Fig. 5 and
SI). At a particular time (a survey), each group is represented as a
colored point in the 2D-plot, whose position indicates the profiles
of Sense of belonging feelings corresponding to this group. The
evolution of each group through time is explicitly showed joining
the consecutive points of the group resulting in a continuous
colored broken line in the 2D-plot. Relevant dates in the period
2006–2019 are also indicated, with the 25N event (2012) marked
in black. To correctly interpret the plot, different National iden-
tity feelings are also represented simultaneously as points in
magenta color, with arrows indicating that if we move closer to
these points, the corresponding identity feelings increase, since
these arrows are the projection of the gradient vector field of the




at some convenient points near the
point which corresponds to a population segment with 100% of
people with the i-th identity feeling. The length of these arrows
also depends of projection: the longer the arrow, the more
important will be the role of the corresponding variable to
interpret group variability.
As can be seen adding the % of explained variance of the x and
y axis of the graph 94.1% of the total variability is well represented
in this 2D-plot. Notice also that the evolution of three of these
four groups evolved similarly by increasing their national identity
feelings ‘Only Catalan’ and ‘More Catalan than Spanish’, or
decreasing the feeling ‘Equal Spanish than Catalan’ (Catalan or
Spanish linguistic subgroups following news through public
Fig. 3 Longitudinal changes of the National Identity Feeling “Only Catalan” across the period 2006–2019, depending on language and media news segmentations.
The size of this identification type went from 14.2% of all Catalonian population at March 2006 survey, up to 23.5% at July 2019. The four bands correspond to
the four citizenry segments obtained crossing the two main categories of Family/Mother language (Catalan vs. Spanish) with the binary variable News
(Regional vs. other), depending on whether the news are followed in regional media or not. Bands based on 95% smooth confidence intervals. The fitted lines,
one for each group, is a linear model fit. Observe the contrast between the biggest group (Family/mother language Spanish, not following news on regional
media: 44.8% at last survey, in green), and the Family/mother language Catalan group who followed news on regional media (21.5%, at last survey, in red).
Notice also the different slopes of regression lines indicating distinctive trends. Moreover, the regression lines corresponding to Spanish language subgroups
(green and blue) intersect around the year 2006 and we may conjecture, by extrapolating, that the Catalan subgroups (red and purple) should have had a
similar behavior in a recent past, around the year 2000. The sizes of blue and purple segments were smaller: 12.5% and 13.4%, respectively, at last survey.
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regional media). The Spanish group (family/mother language)
who did not follow the news through the public regional media
(approx. 44.8% of the population, at July 2019), was an exception
of this radicalizing trend. This group, after a small oscillation
between 2012 and 2013 (closer in time to 25N event, 2012),
returned almost to its initial position. In the remaining groups the
central and remarkable position of 25N 2012 event, is clearly
visible, to the point of an apparent delimitation of two clusters
within each group. Groups B and C appear to be moving, lately,
towards their initial positions.
Similar plots were built for preferred political-territorial link
with Spain, to analyze the evolution of preferences about political
ties between Catalonia and Spain (See SI Figs. SI-1, SI-2).
Discussion
Our analyses focused mainly on “Sense of belonging” (National
identity feelings) since it is a variable which (a) has been present
invariably in all CEO surveys and (b) has shown dramatic
changes along the secessionist surge (the so-called “el procés”)
(Amat, 2015; Barrio and Field, 2018; Coll et al., 2018; Elliot,
2018). As argued above, the eruption of the secessionist campaign
delimited two periods: long and stable previous decades when
dual-national identity (Sense of belonging: Equal Catalan than
Spanish) was dominant and worked as an amalgamating factor
for Catalonian society (Amat, 2015; Elliot, 2018); and the current
one, when an abrupt polarization lead the citizenry into antag-
onistic and confronted blocks, one formed by those with single-
identity Catalan (dominant on the secessionist field), and a sec-
ond one where dual-identity Cat-Spanish prevails (dominant on
the unionist field).
By exploiting the microdata of the whole series of repeated
CEO surveys, Fig. 2 displays a fundamental finding. It shows the
evolution of Sense of belonging (National identity feelings) dif-
ferentiated into two main citizenry segments: family/mother
language Catalan versus family/mother language Spanish. For the
first one there was a striking variation in a short period: an
intense erosion of the dual-identity (Spn=Cat, at Figures) and an
intense increase of the single-identity Only Catalan. Note that, in
this segment, the single-identity Only Catalan scaled approxi-
mately 30 percentual points in less than eight years. To our
knowledge, there are no other examples of such dramatic changes
in national identity within a stable Western society, in such a
short period. In contrast, for the segment family/mother language
Spanish, the dual-identity (Spn=Cat) continued with nearly no
erosion (neither we see appreciable variation towards the single-
identity Only Spanish). Figure 1 also documents the sudden
change, around 2012, on national identity of two fractions,
namely the “Equal Catalan than Spanish” and “Only Catalan”,
two population segments that are likely to contribute with
cohesion or division, respectively, within the whole society. The
outstanding feature of Figs. 2a, b is the detailed dissection of such
important variations, documenting the differences in the evolu-
tion of sense of belonging among these two segments.
This statistical evidence, supported by more than 45 surveys
amounting to 88.538 observations is striking, given the extended
previous period in which no moves were seen on this key,
national identity variable (Tormos et al., 2014; Barrio and Field,
2018). It is worth noting that the change introduced by CEO, at
2011, asking for ‘childhood or maternal language' instead of
‘family language' may have had some consequences, although
they were not apparent at all in the observed series. Cultivation of
Fig. 4 Longitudinal changes of the National Identity Feeling “Equal Catalan than Spanish” across the period 2006–2019, depending on language and media
news segmentations. The size of this identification type went from 42.5% at March 2006 survey, to 39.2% at July 2019. The four bands correspond to the
four citizenry segments obtained crossing the two main categories of Family/Mother language (Catalan vs. Spanish) with the binary variable News
(Regional vs. other), depending on whether the news is followed in regional media or not. Bands based on 95% smooth confidence intervals. The fitted
lines, one for each group, is a linear model fit. Observe the contrast between the biggest group (Family/mother language Spanish, not following news on
regional media: 44.8% at last survey, in green) and the Family/mother language Catalan segment who followed news on regional media (21.5% at last
survey, in red). They exhibited the highest difference. The biggest trend slopes differences occur when comparing the Spanish segments (green and blue).
Notice that dark green and blue lines intersected at 2008, indicating that around this year both groups behaved similarly with respect to the dependent
variable. The sizes of blue and purple segments were smaller: 12.5% and 13.4%, respectively, last survey.
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double or multilayered national identity feelings has been argued
to be preventive for societies harboring unsealed ethno-cultural
frontiers, whereas promoting single-identity national feelings,
either only Catalan or only Spanish in this case, can be a source of
social unrest and potentially serious confrontations (Horowitz,
2001; Esteban and Ray, 2008; Esteban et al., 2012). In con-
sequence, it may be wise to invest resources promoting double-
identities.
Figures 3, 4 show that following Regional public media (TV
and Radio) under control of Regional Government (both
broadcasting in Catalan language, exclusively) correlated with a
higher polarization around the issue of secession in the main
language segments, family/mother language Catalan and family/
mother language Spanish, with some differences. Concerning the
first group, the results are compatible with the hypothesis that a
good number of people with family/mother language Catalan rely
above all on the regional public media (Garcia, 2013; Tobeña,
2017; Oller et al, 2019a, 2019b) which additionally, broadcast
exclusively in Catalan language. A good part of the segment with
family/mother language Catalan follows political news through
these regional public media (it accounts for approximately 21.5%
of overall population, at the last survey) and they can become
disseminators themselves through family/friends networks. This
may explain why the group with family/mother language Catalan
that do not follow news in the regional public media is also
affected (it accounts for approximately 13.4% of overall popula-
tion, last survey), albeit in an attenuated way: the growth rate of


































































































































































































































































Fig. 5 2D−Dynamic Profile Diagram of National Identity Feelings across the period 2006–2019. For the four citizenry segments obtained crossing Family/
Mother language (Catalan vs. Spanish) and News (following news on public regional media or not). Group A (red): Family/mother language Catalan,
following news on regional media (21.5% at July 2019 survey); Group B (purple): Family/mother language Catalan not following news on regional media
(13.4% at July 2019 survey); Group C (blue): Family/mother language Spanish, following news on public regional media (12.5% at July 2019 survey);
Group D (green): Family/mother language Spanish not following news on regional media (44.8% at July 2019 survey). This diagram summarizes the
evolution of identity profiles for each colored group (24 series of respondent answers coming from 45 surveys, 2006–2019) in a mathematical space in
which each point represents the percentages of National Identity Feelings within a group. Notice that Groups A–C suffered a clear displacement in the space
of National Identity Feelings pre and post 25N regional elections (November 25th, 2012), in the sense of a greater polarization (‘Only Catalan’ feeling
increases when we move to the top-right of the diagram). Group D exhibited a small movement near the event of 25N, but returned to its original position
at present. Notice that this group is the biggest one (44.8%, last survey: July 2019). This is a two-dimension reduction with quality of representation of
83% in the x-axes and 6.8% in the y-axis (overall, a quality of representation of 94.1%).
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growth rate of those who follow regional public media. The key
factor is the trust on media that everyone view as ‘familiar' within
these two segments. Notice the contrasting evolution of red
(regional public media) vs. purple (other media), for the family/
mother language Catalan group at Figs. 3, 4.
Concerning the second group, family/mother language Spanish
two facts deserve attention. First, the segment who follow news
through public regional media (it accounts for 12.5% approx. of
overall population, last survey) changed their identity feelings in
the same direction as the group with family/mother language
Catalan. However, the family/mother language Spanish segment
who does not follow news through public regional media
(accounting for 44.8% approx. of overall population, last survey)
remained stable, without appreciable changes. Secondly, there was
an absence of significant polarization at the opposite national
Identity ‘Only Spanish’. This fact is compatible with the con-
jecture that public regional media were a source of polarizing
inputs, as the remaining media, which broadcast to all Spain, have
not paid as much attention to regional political crises despite its
relevance at particular moments. Figure SI-S4 (see SI) shows the
absence of intensification of National identity feelings in the
citizenry segment who follow news in Spanish generalist TV
channels broadcasting to all of Spain (it accounts for approxi-
mately 32.9% of overall population, last survey), independently of
their family/mother language.
Notice the contrasting evolution of blue (regional public
media) vs. dark green (other media), for the family/mother lan-
guage Spanish group at Figs. 3, 4. The evolution of identity feelings
shown at these Figures, where we interacted family language with
preferences for following Regional media, raises suspicions about
the persuasive role played by the contents of public TV and Radio
controlled by Autonomous powers. We must highlight the fact
that the narrowing and intensification on National identity feel-
ings only occurred in the segment with family/mother language
Catalan, whereas the segment family/mother language Spanish,
larger in size, did not significantly evolved in the opposite
direction, towards a 'Only Spanish' identity. This contributes to
diminish the chances of an open conflict. The erosion of dual-
identity feelings within these segments would be a loss of the
amalgamating capital of a citizenry that shares the same territory
(in Catalonia, this means usually face to face doors).
Two recognizable “turning points” signaled clear departures
towards distinctive polarization profiles among those segments of
Catalan citizenship subgroups. The first one appeared shortly
before the sentence of the Spanish High Court, at 2010, modifying
the Autonomy Statute that had been approved at 2006. A second
and much more important one was the decision taken by the
moderate nationalist party that had been leading the Regional
Government, for decades, of adopting a secessionist agenda
around autumn 2012. In his systematic comparison between the
lawful and agreed Scottish bid for independence (preceding the
2014 referendum), and the unlawful and unilateral at Catalonia,
Elliot (2018) identified the same “breaking points”. Our plots
show that the appearance of the first one contradicts the depiction
of Catalonian secessionist push as an outrage reaction against the
“deep grievance” of the sentence from High Spanish Court,
modifying a few articles the 2006 new Statute of Autonomy that
had been voted by a minority of citizens. Pro-secession polar-
ization within a fraction of citizenry had already started before
such sentence. This is compatible with the conjecture that the
impact of the TC sentence about the new Home Rule was relevant
mainly to the extent that it has been used, extensively, as a
political weapon to invigorate secessionist activism and increase
polarization5.
Much more decisive was, however, the period leading to the
regional elections at 25th Nov 2012. Such elections marked, in
fact, the definitive point of departure for the secessionist wave,
when Catalonian President at that time (leading a moderate
nationalist party) lose the majority at the Autonomous Parlia-
ment. From that moment onwards, parliamentary majority
depended from various secessionist forces and the Government
opted for secession from Spain as its dominant strategy (Barrio
and Field, 2018; Elliot, 2018). Figure 2 illustrates how, around
these elections, a segment of citizenry (formed mainly by those
with family/mother language Catalan and reporting “only Cata-
lan”, as national identity), departed from a previous slowly rising
tendency (Bertomeus, 2018a), towards an abrupt acceleration.
Percentages peaked on the first (illegal) consultation about
secession (9 Nov 2014), and the rising stabilized at high levels all
along the struggle between Regional and Spanish powers that
persist today. This segment displayed parallel trends on several
measures: national identity feelings (“sense of belonging”); pre-
ferences for political links with Spain (opting for “independence”);
and expressing support for secession on a hypothetic (and legal)
referendum for self-determination (see SI1-SI2 Figures). Such
narrowing of national self-identification linked to preferences for
secession showed by this group of “Catalan-natives” mainly, was
not mirrored in the other big segments of citizenry (those with
either Spanish or both Catalan+Spanish languages as their
family/mother language). These fractions tended to maintain
their dual “CatSpanish” national identities without noticeable
changes. Globally, our systematic results confirmed the out-
standing polarization around the issue of secession that Llaneras
(2017), Marí-Klose (2018), Bertomeus (2018), Guntermann et al.
(2018), Rodón and Guinjoan (2019), and Maza et al. (2019) had
already shown departing from a handful of surveying points or
from electoral results.
Following or not the news on Regional public media was an
important mediator of changes on National identity feelings
(“sense of belonging”) and for preferences for secession. The
strong gaps on media following preferences (news and political
debates) based essentially on family-language divisions, surely
contributed to exaggerate distinctive communal affections and
frames of reference at both sides of the ethnolinguistic frontier:
Catalans vs. CatSpanish. TV channels, newspapers and broad-
casting stations which are directly or indirectly under control of
the Regional Government not only dominated but fully encap-
sulated the secessionist audiences operating only or mostly, in
Catalan language. This represents an obvious mismatch as
Spanish is the language of daily use of more than half of Catalan
citizens, thus reflecting the operation of a “communication bub-
ble” that nourished the secessionist fraction: middle class natives
and assimilated citizens who use Catalan language almost
exclusively, in their daily routines and get their political opinion
mainly from regional/local media (Barrio and Field, 2018; Coll
et al., 2018; Miley, 2007, 2013; Crameri, 2014, 2015; Tobeña,
2017a; Rodon and Guinjoan, 2018). Despite unsolved discussions
on the relative power of media to modify social opinion, there is
agreement on their influence upon segmented audiences (Quat-
trociocchi et al., 2011, 2014, Shoemaker and Stremlau, 2014).
Before the dawn of secessionist surge, Miley (2007) established
the existence of divergent modes of national identification across
the main segments of Catalan society that depended on an eth-
nolinguistic frontier. Departing from CIS6 surveys and other
social data, he challenged the depiction of Catalonian nationalism
as a form of “civic nationalism.” He showed that Catalan society
contained an ethnolinguistic cleavage that distinguished self-
identification of two main population segments: “native, Catalan
speaking” citizens and their Spanish-speaking neighbors with
immigrant origins from other parts of Spain. “Mother tongue”
had, in fact, the strongest impact upon an individual’s self-
identification as predominantly Catalan vs. predominantly
ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0357-z
10 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |           (2019) 5:148 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0357-z | www.nature.com/palcomms
Spanish o mixed “CatSpanish” identities. In subsequent studies,
Miley (2013) showed that there was a gap between political
preferences of wide segments of citizenry and those of their
representatives at the Autonomous Parliament: the language
policy implemented by Regional powers was inconsistent with
preferences of Spanish-speaking citizens. He identified, moreover,
two mechanisms that blocked their representation into the
Region’s institutions: (1) a clear under-representation of those
citizens in the Autonomous Parliament; and (2) a partial assim-
ilation of some Spanish-speaking elected politicians into the
attitudes of Catalan-speaking rulers. He concluded that the social
bases of support for Catalan nationalism were “overwhelmingly
ethnic” and that the movement was an elite-led, “top down”
project. The present findings add likelihood to that hypothesis,
since we see that the ethnolinguistic factor is highly associated to
distinctive polarization during the secessionist surge. Divergent
polarizing profiles associated also to differential exposures to the
media under control of Regional powers.
Boylan (2015) had already shown, that national identity (being
Catalan native or assimilated) was a much stronger predictor of
the desire for secession, than perceived grievances resulting from
an unfair fiscal treatment or other economic and political factors
(analyzing CEO surveys, 2011–2013). Applying different statistical
methods both Bel et al. (2019) and Romero-Vidal (2019) have
emphasized the inability of important contextual factors to explain
the surge and maintenance of Catalonian secessionist push: nei-
ther the impact of the deep economic crisis between 2008–2013 or
the evolution of preferences for policy attitudes at the Region,
along the whole period 1991–2018, were able to convincingly
explain the appearance of intense and sustained demands for full
sovereignty. In this regard, the present findings may represent an
initial step for more extensive and fruitful approaches to an
unexpected and mostly not yet explained secession crisis.
The highest achievement of the secessionist movement was the
creation of an intense devotion for the goal of Catalonian inde-
pendence, to the point of carrying the emphatic characteristics of
a collective romantic passion that engaged an impressive segment
of citizenry (Tobeña, 2017a). Such passion hardly enticed, how-
ever, the rest of Catalan population. The ingroup self-glorification
ingredients conveyed by such nationalistic passion excluded, by
definition, other actors within the region (Roccas et al., 2006;
Leidner et al., 2010; Waytz et al., 2014). Fulfilling a dream for
reaching full sovereignty by agreed and democratic pathways
requires a clear majority, but Catalan secessionists appeared
convinced that they deserved a swift and easy separation from
Spain on the bases of a tiny parliamentary (non-social) majority.
This belief might perhaps derive from “collective narcissism”
(Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, 2019), a propensity that amounts to
a conviction in the greatness of one’s group accompanied by
demands of external validation. Those narcissists typically
demand privileged recognition and treatment, not equal rights.
Recent findings indicated that national collective narcissism
mediated voting behavior in the Unites States: besides intense
partisanship (Mason, 2018), this trait was a main factor pre-
dicting Trump victory in the 2016 US election (Golec de Zavala
et al., 2017). Collective narcissism also mediated Brexit 2016 vote,
at UK (Federico and Golec de Zavala, 2018), along with other
cognitive mediators (Zmigrod et al., 2018). Specific studies on this
issue would be required that should encompass not only Cata-
lonian secessionists but also people from recently reactivated
pockets of Spanish nationalism.
The lack of a social majority behind the secessionist push
opened apprehensions that had been tampered for decades
(Amat, 2015, 2017; Coll et al., 2018; Crameri, 2014; Elliott, 2018),
and it is hard to foresee pathways to defuse current tensions. The
pressure applied by the secessionist field included many forms of
contextual intimidation to keep silent the majority of citizenry
(Barrio and Field, 2018; Morel, 2018; Tobeña, 2017a, 2018). Our
findings indicate that family language has worked as a dividing
line but also as a protective umbrella to preserve a mixed Cat-
Spanish national identity, during a period of relentless social
pressure coming from secessionist activism and local media.
Other types of social influence were used extensively, with the aim
of deepening political polarization. A large-scale analysis pro-
vided solid evidence that during the 2017 illegal “referendum” for
Catalonian independence, analyzed as a case study, social bots
generated and promoted violent content, aimed mainly at the
secessionist population segment (Stella et al., 2018). Nearly 4
million Twitter posts, on that issue, generated by almost 1 million
users were monitored and analyzed during two weeks around
such event. The findings clearly indicated that automated social
hacking contributed to exacerbate a severe political conflict.
In conclusion, the present findings showed that an ethno-
linguistic cleavage based mainly on family/mother language
(Catalan vs. Spanish) worked as a dividing line for a serious
political confrontation between secessionists and unionists. This
is the first complete quantitative analyses of the distinctive evo-
lution of National identity feelings among those population seg-
ments, during the period 2006–2019. The findings underscore the
crucial role played by media influence to accentuate political
polarization and partisanship around the issue of secession. They
provide a workable example of how ethnolinguistic frontiers can
be used as fracture line for divisive conflict within an advanced,
open and democratic European context. We suspect that there are
still political avenues to be pursued, with the aim of preventing
the conversion of the ongoing secessionist challenge, in Catalonia,
into a chronic and intractable ethno-political conflict. Departing
from objective and thorough statistical data could be, perhaps, a
good starting point for giving chances to encompassing instead of
divisive and dangerous polarizing policies.
Data availability
As already stated our primary data are public and easily accesible
at CEO web (Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió, http://ceo.gencat.cat/). In
addition to the data provided both at Main Text and SI sections,
many other analytical and graphic results were obtained for the
period 2006–2019. In particular, all series of mosaic plots derived
by crossing different pairs of variables. All of them can be sup-
plied by the authors to interested readers on demand.
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Notes
1 We use the label “Unionists” to identify the citizenry who is against secession, for
practical reasons. This label permits an immediate understanding of the opposing
postures. We are fully aware that some anti-secession forces prefer the term
“Constitutionalists” or “Non-secessionists” because “Unionism” carries, in Catalonia, a
deprecating tone and can be used as an insult during hot political debates.
2 Catalan language is mandatory, as first language, at primary school and most of high
school (See: “Usos lingüístics de la població de Catalunya: Enquesta 2013, Generalitat
de Catalunya: Departament de Cultura, http://llengua.gencat.cat/web/.content/
documents/publicacions/altres/arxius/eulp2013_fullet.pdf.)
3 CEO (Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió, http://ceo.gencat.cat/).
4 Until summer 2011 the survey question explicitly asked for ‘family language’, after that
for ‘childhood language in the family’, see more details at SI Appendix.
5 See SI and Oller et al. 2019b: a less technical essay directed to a general audience, on
similar targets as the present one but involving a smaller data set and with more
emphasis on economic aspects.
6 CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/ES/index.
html).
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